Syrian Democratic Forces

By Ali Aziz:

The media widely regard the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as representing the Kurdish people in Syria. SDF demands national and cultural rights for Kurds and others, and the enshrinement of these rights in the Syrian constitution. On January 4, 2026, an SDF delegation, headed by Mazloum Abdi, was in Damascus negotiating with the Syrian government. However, the Syrian government delegation abruptly ended the talks without explanation. The SDF delegation returned to its areas, and the following day, a Syrian government delegation travelled to Paris for indirect negotiations with Israel, sponsored by Washington.

It appears that, during the Paris negotiations, the Syrian delegation received a green light from the US to launch military operations against SDF-held areas, starting with Aleppo. On January 5, Syrian government forces began advancing towards areas previously controlled by the SDF. After six days of fighting, the remaining SDF forces withdrew from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, following an unequal battle with the Syrian Interim Government militias that had besieged the city. The two neighbourhoods were almost destroyed after being bombarded by government militias using drones, artillery, and tanks. This is exactly what happened to the city of Hama in 1982 at the hands of Syrian forces under the leadership of the late President Hafez al-Assad. The SDF forces in Aleppo consisted of a few hundred fighters with light weapons, while the government militias numbered more than 30,000 heavily armed fighters.

The Syrian government’s victory in Aleppo gave it the impetus and momentum to continue its military campaign towards the city of Hasakah and the areas controlled by the SDF, under what could be described as a green light from the US-led coalition. Contributing to the collapse of the SDF’s defences was the presence of large Arab tribal forces that refused to fight the government. These tribes quickly merged with the Syrian army within hours, and thus the SDF lost the Arab areas that had been under the control of these tribal forces for years. To understand what happened in Syria and the dramatic collapse of the SDF, we must note three dimensions of current politics: the international, the regional, and finally the internal on the Kurdish level, what is happening inside the Kurdish house in Rojava (meaning Western Kurdistan), and the turbulent Kurdish reality in the region in general.

On the international stage, US policy under Trump has undergone significant and sometimes surprising shifts, underscoring its unreliability in any region of the world when it comes to formulating policies and achieving objectives. America bombed Iran during the twelve-day war with Israel, destroying the Fordow facility. Yet, at least so far, it has not intervened to support the Iranian people who took to the streets in most Iranian cities. America, which abandoned the Ukrainian president while he was its guest in Washington, overthrew Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and declared its right to control that country’s oil. Meanwhile, there is a direct threat to annex Greenland and other territories, while the possibility of launching strikes against countries in South America, and perhaps Iran, if necessary, remains. This context explains why America is not a permanent ally to any entity in the world, except Israel, for specific and well-known reasons. Therefore, what primarily motivates America is business and self-interest, which fluctuate with changing circumstances and power dynamics. The European side, which has less influence in the Middle East, is also bound by these circumstances and equations, perhaps even more so than America, in accepting new realities, abandoning less significant allies, and entering into political deals even with entities described, or previously described, as terrorist or otherwise. Europe has a long history of such equations, particularly concerning the Kurds and the Turkish and Iranian regimes for decades. To illustrate this point, it’s worth recalling the concept of ‘Critical Dialogue’ launched by the European Union in the 1990s, which served as a pretext for restoring relations with the Iranian regime in 1997. This followed the European Court of Justice’s condemnation of the Iranian regime for the assassination of Kurdish leaders in Berlin in 1992, in the case known as the Mykonos Tribunal. The court’s rulings were disregarded, and European countries resumed relations with Iran under the umbrella of critical dialogue, driven by economic and trade interests. Therefore, the European-Kurdish relationship has remained captive to equations and fluctuations that often come at the expense of Kurdish aspirations. In reality, the Kurds have no better alternative than to continue their struggle with all their might. This has been precisely the Achilles’ heel for the Kurds in Syria, as it is for Kurds in general. This explains the weak European presence in the current events in Syria. The Western coalition’s stance culminated today when Tom Barrack declared, “The American alliance with the SDF against ISIS has ended.” However, Europe, through France and Britain, has reconsidered its position, as the SDF still controls Kurdish areas, and the momentum of the Syrian victory has significantly diminished following the rise in Kurdish enthusiasm across all parts of Kurdistan and the increased Kurdish fervour for resistance.