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Syrian Democratic Forces
By Ali Aziz:
The media widely regard the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as representing the Kurdish people in Syria. SDF demands national and cultural rights for Kurds and others, and the enshrinement of these rights in the Syrian constitution. On January 4, 2026, an SDF delegation, headed by Mazloum Abdi, was in Damascus negotiating with the Syrian government. However, the Syrian government delegation abruptly ended the talks without explanation. The SDF delegation returned to its areas, and the following day, a Syrian government delegation travelled to Paris for indirect negotiations with Israel, sponsored by Washington.
It appears that, during the Paris negotiations, the Syrian delegation received a green light from the US to launch military operations against SDF-held areas, starting with Aleppo. On January 5, Syrian government forces began advancing towards areas previously controlled by the SDF. After six days of fighting, the remaining SDF forces withdrew from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, following an unequal battle with the Syrian Interim Government militias that had besieged the city. The two neighbourhoods were almost destroyed after being bombarded by government militias using drones, artillery, and tanks. This is exactly what happened to the city of Hama in 1982 at the hands of Syrian forces under the leadership of the late President Hafez al-Assad. The SDF forces in Aleppo consisted of a few hundred fighters with light weapons, while the government militias numbered more than 30,000 heavily armed fighters.
The Syrian government’s victory in Aleppo gave it the impetus and momentum to continue its military campaign towards the city of Hasakah and the areas controlled by the SDF, under what could be described as a green light from the US-led coalition. Contributing to the collapse of the SDF’s defences was the presence of large Arab tribal forces that refused to fight the government. These tribes quickly merged with the Syrian army within hours, and thus the SDF lost the Arab areas that had been under the control of these tribal forces for years. To understand what happened in Syria and the dramatic collapse of the SDF, we must note three dimensions of current politics: the international, the regional, and finally the internal on the Kurdish level, what is happening inside the Kurdish house in Rojava (meaning Western Kurdistan), and the turbulent Kurdish reality in the region in general.
On the international stage, US policy under Trump has undergone significant and sometimes surprising shifts, underscoring its unreliability in any region of the world when it comes to formulating policies and achieving objectives. America bombed Iran during the twelve-day war with Israel, destroying the Fordow facility. Yet, at least so far, it has not intervened to support the Iranian people who took to the streets in most Iranian cities. America, which abandoned the Ukrainian president while he was its guest in Washington, overthrew Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and declared its right to control that country’s oil. Meanwhile, there is a direct threat to annex Greenland and other territories, while the possibility of launching strikes against countries in South America, and perhaps Iran, if necessary, remains. This context explains why America is not a permanent ally to any entity in the world, except Israel, for specific and well-known reasons. Therefore, what primarily motivates America is business and self-interest, which fluctuate with changing circumstances and power dynamics. The European side, which has less influence in the Middle East, is also bound by these circumstances and equations, perhaps even more so than America, in accepting new realities, abandoning less significant allies, and entering into political deals even with entities described, or previously described, as terrorist or otherwise. Europe has a long history of such equations, particularly concerning the Kurds and the Turkish and Iranian regimes for decades. To illustrate this point, it’s worth recalling the concept of ‘Critical Dialogue’ launched by the European Union in the 1990s, which served as a pretext for restoring relations with the Iranian regime in 1997. This followed the European Court of Justice’s condemnation of the Iranian regime for the assassination of Kurdish leaders in Berlin in 1992, in the case known as the Mykonos Tribunal. The court’s rulings were disregarded, and European countries resumed relations with Iran under the umbrella of critical dialogue, driven by economic and trade interests. Therefore, the European-Kurdish relationship has remained captive to equations and fluctuations that often come at the expense of Kurdish aspirations. In reality, the Kurds have no better alternative than to continue their struggle with all their might. This has been precisely the Achilles’ heel for the Kurds in Syria, as it is for Kurds in general. This explains the weak European presence in the current events in Syria. The Western coalition’s stance culminated today when Tom Barrack declared, “The American alliance with the SDF against ISIS has ended.” However, Europe, through France and Britain, has reconsidered its position, as the SDF still controls Kurdish areas, and the momentum of the Syrian victory has significantly diminished following the rise in Kurdish enthusiasm across all parts of Kurdistan and the increased Kurdish fervour for resistance.
Regionally, Turkey remains the greatest obstacle to the Kurdish national liberation movement. For a century, the Turkish state has devoted all its resources to entrenching Ataturk’s ideology across all aspects of social and political life. This ideology is so alien and aberrant that it denies obvious realities, such as the existence of the Kurdish people, not only in Turkey but globally. Although some Turkish politicians, including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have attempted to eradicate this ideology, its deep-rootedness and entrenchment within Turkish society have prevented its complete elimination. Since 1991, Turkey has lived in great fear of Iraqi Kurdistan and a growing apprehension about the rise of armed nationalist struggle in Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran, and, more recently, Syria since 2011, as well as within Turkey itself since 1984, when the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey first erupted. The Kurdistan Region, established with Western support as a safe haven for Kurds after they suffered genocide with internationally prohibited weapons in Iraq, has evolved into a constitutional federal system within Iraq, a constant source of anxiety for Turkey. This reality has been met with persistent rejection from Turkey, and its suffering intensified after Kurdish forces, later known as the SDF, seized control of a large part of northern and eastern Syria, the region Kurds refer to as Western Kurdistan, along with areas outside Kurdistan, namely Arab regions bordering Kurdish areas. Because the SDF fought ISIS with such force that it garnered international admiration, and because the Western coalition, led by the United States, considered the SDF an ally and friend, this dealt a significant blow to Turkey, whose fears grew even more acute due to the direct impact of this situation on the Kurdish population within Turkey, which numbers around thirty million or more. Therefore, Turkey began strongly supporting ISIS, opening its borders to volunteers from around the world to enter Syria, supporting ISIS against the SDF, and supplying ISIS and other Islamist factions with weapons and money, though it continues to deny it. Today, Turkey plays a major role in Syria. Turkey and Qatar are the dominant powers in the interim government headed by al-Sharaa, and both consider Syria their strongest arm in the region. Therefore, Turkey and Qatar are keen to protect Syria from partition, viewing it as a bulwark against Israel and the possibility of Israel penetrating the region through the division of Syria, which would also affect Turkey itself. Adding to the complexity is Saudi support for Syria, given that the majority of Syrian forces are composed of Wahhabi jihadist Islamist groups. The new Syrian regime is dealing with these countries with remarkable pragmatism while achieving successive battlefield victories. This reality has burdened the SDF, which has lost much international support in a hostile regional environment, particularly from Turkey. Al Jazeera, which employs many Syrians, Islamists and supporters of jihadist organisations, played a prominent role in this campaign, perhaps more so than Syrian government-affiliated channels.
On the Kurdish domestic front, the SDF is considered a young and politically inexperienced institution, despite its battlefield strength and the experience it gained in the war against ISIS. To this day, the SDF remains captive to the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Marmara Prison in Turkey since the last century. The problem is that Öcalan, now under the influence of Turkish intelligence, is isolated from the outside world and has become a tool in the hands of the Turkish government to neutralise the Kurdish national struggle and steer it towards paths that are safe for Turkey, thus avoiding its inevitable threat to Turkey. The PKK, which Öcalan founded, formed the SDF and selected its leadership. The PKK suffers from a dictatorship stemming from Marxist ideology, an exclusionary dictatorship that it practices in any area it controls. The SDF, however, draws its strength from the Kurdish nationalist movement and the perceived oppression of the Kurds as a people. The young Kurdish fighters, both boys and girls, are extremely enthusiastic, but their recruitment, driven by Kurdish nationalism, has been squandered on channels unrelated to Kurdish national aspirations. These channels are those promoted by the SDF, which espouses Öcalan’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consequently, the SDF has practised exclusion against other Kurdish parties and groups, preventing their presence in the Rojava region since 2011, despite attempts by Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani to form a unified front of Kurdish parties in Syria. This reality has prevented the SDF from becoming a comprehensive and inclusive popular force for the Kurds in Syria. Therefore, the decline of the SDF is the decline of a rigid Marxist organisation that was poised to dominate the global stage for years. When the conditions that enabled its rise disappeared, its demise became contingent on its continued political, educational, and social deficiencies. However, the Kurdish question in Syria has entered a new phase. The Kurdistan Region’s influence in Rojava is growing, and the Kurdish reality will witness major developments from now on. I am optimistic about that.
This article was written on January 23, 2026. Since then, several events have taken place, which I will discuss in another article to keep this one concise.
