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By Arian Mufid:
Protest in Iranian Kurdistan, October 2022
Iran is governed as an Islamic theocracy, where the Supreme Leader has ultimate authority over the military, judiciary, and major policies. Khomani and his regime of terror came to power in 1979 with the help of western world and since then Iran exporting their terror all over the world. Khomeini died on 2005 and Ali Khamenei, had ruled since 1989. Ali Khameni was killed in a U.S.–Israeli strike in February 2026, during escalating tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. This has created a major leadership vacuum and uncertainty about who will control the state. Other key power centers still exist: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) the clerical establishment the presidency (currently Masoud Pezeshkian) These factions could compete for power as the political system tries to stabilize. On 8 March, Khameni’s son, Mojtaba, was appointed to succeed him as Supreme Leader.
Iran has been experiencing nationwide protests since late 2025 economic collapse, inflation has rising by 40%, currency devaluation, inflation and shortages, anger at the ruling system The demonstrations spread to over 100 cities and are considered the largest challenge to the government since the 1979 revolution. Many protests began with economic grievances but soon turned into explicit anti-government protests questioning the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Authorities have responded with extreme repression: mass arrests, shootings of protesters, internet shutdowns, executions and death sentences. Estimates of the death toll from the crackdown vary widely: sources close to Kurdistan Tribune inside Iran suggest tens of thousands were killed during the unrest. Human rights groups say the repression has been one of the deadliest in decades. Iran’s economy is under severe stress due to several factors: international sanctions, currency collapse The rapid fall of the Iranian currency (rial) and price shocks were major drivers of the recent protests. The government also shut down much of the internet during the protests, which hurt businesses and financial activity. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement that began in 2022 still influences protests. Many activists oppose:
Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) is significant because it sits at the intersection of Kurdistan’s Historic identity, political struggle and regional geopolitics. A flashpoint for political resistance especially today. Its importance comes from comination demography with culture heritage, strategic geography and its central role in contemporary movements for rights and autonomy. There is an estimated 8–10 million Kurds living across the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamadan—the official provincial capital—but Kermanshah is strategically important, and Mahabad carries deep historical symbolism. It was the birthplace of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, the most iconic attempt at establishing a Kurdish state, led by Qazi Muhammad. He later became the leader of the republic and was executed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi after its collapse.
Kurdish forces from this region fought in major historical conflicts, including against the Safavid Empire at the Battle of Chaldiran. Kurdish political parties and activists in Rojhelat are heavily targeted by the Iranian regime since it came to power. The two leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran were assassinated in Europe—Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Sadegh Sharafkandi—illustrating the reach and brutality of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After Bakur, Rojhelat contains one of the largest Kurdish populations in the world. The region is religiously diverse: Sunni and Shia Kurds, as well as Christians, Jews, Yarsanis, and Yazidis all live there. Kurds have suffered some of the harshest repression under the rule of the Ayatollahs since they came to power following the Iranian Revolution. Rojhelat is also one of the most economically underdeveloped parts of Iran, with high unemployment and poverty rates, and few opportunities for investment, infrastructure, or access to services.
Many Kurds rely on kolbarí—dangerous cross-border goods carrying—to survive, often risking death. In Rojhelat, this informal labor has become a means of economic survival for many living along the mountainous frontier.
Rojhelat has also become a focal point of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began after the killing of Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish woman from Saqqez. The slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (“Woman, Life, Freedom”) originates from the Kurdish freedom movement and was popularized by groups such as Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), spreading from Rojhelat across Iran. The political struggle in the region has largely centered on cultural rights, political representation, demands for autonomy, and resistance to centralized government control.
One of the earliest major Kurdish uprisings in modern Iran was the revolt led by Simko Shikak between 1918 and 1922. Simko attempted to establish Kurdish autonomy in the region, but the effort ultimately failed, in part because it lacked unified support among Kurdish tribes. Eventually, Simko Shikak was assassinated through an Iranian plot after being called to negotiations by the Iranian authorities. The Republic of Mahabad in 1946 was a short-lived Kurdish state established in the city of Mahabad. It was led by Qazi Muhammad and supported indirectly by the Soviet Union during its occupation of northern Iran following World War II. The Kurdish state collapsed when Soviet forces withdrew and the Iranian army reoccupied the region. After 1946, the principal Kurdish political organizations advocating Kurdish political rights were the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. These parties and movements have long been banned inside Iran, and many of their leaders have been assassinated in exile. Among the most notable were Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989 and Sadegh Sharafkandi in 1992.Human rights conditions in Eastern Kurdistan—the Kurdish-majority regions of western Iran such as Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and parts of West Azerbaijan—are widely described by human rights organizations as systematically repressive .Kurdish regions have historically been centers of anti-government protest, and the state response has often been violent. During a crackdown linked to protests in early 2026, at least 257 Kurdish civilians were reportedly killed, including 20 children and 19 women.
Violations occur in several areas: political rights, civil liberties, cultural rights, economic conditions, and the use of lethal force by the state. Kurdish individuals are often arrested without warrants during intelligence raids and held without clear charges, and may face accusations such as “propaganda against the state,” “disturbing public order,” or alleged links to banned Kurdish parties. Political trials are commonly held in Revolutionary Courts, where defendants have limited access to lawyers and evidence. Iran already has one of the highest execution rates in the world, and Kurdish people are disproportionately affected. In 2025, more than 1,500 executions were reported nationwide, with at least 231 Kurdish prisoners executed—a disproportionate share given that Kurds make up about 12% of Iran’s population. Rojhelat is among the least economically developed regions in Iran, with high unemployment and limited investment. This economic disparity contributes to the migration of youth, reliance on risky border trade, and increased vulnerability to exploitation and pressure from security forces. Demographic and geographic importance Zagros Mountains: Much of the region lies in the Zagros Mountains, which historically helped Kurdish communities maintain cultural autonomy. For reference its border position; It sits near the borders with Iraq and Turkey, making it a key cross-border cultural and political zone. Its access to Natural resources; Parts of the region contain oil, gas, and agricultural valleys, especially around Kermanshah. Trade routes; Historically important routes linking Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau pass through this area. Eastern Kurdistan has a long history of uprisings and movements for autonomy. From the Republic of Mahabad (1946) to local protests against centralization policies in Iran, the region has shown that Kurdish populations are willing to mobilize for self-determination. This historical consciousness fosters a foundation for future freedom movements because the memory of past struggles provides both legitimacy and a blueprint.
The Kurdish identity in Eastern Kurdistan is tightly knit through language, traditions, and shared social norms. The persistence of Kurdish language education (albeit often limited), literature, and local media helps sustain national consciousness. A strong cultural identity can act as the bedrock for political and social mobilization, which is essential for any freedom movement. If meaningful democratic change occurred there—such as local autonomy, free political participation, or decentralization—it could have ripple effects across several regions where Kurds live. It could encourage political reforms among Kurds in Bakur, foster greater coordination with the autonomous Kurdish region in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and inspire political models similar to the governing system in Rojava.
If democratic governance worked well in Rojhelat, it could become a model for Kurdish self-governance. Democratic change in Kurdish areas could also influence border politics within Iran. Other ethnic regions—such as Baluch, Arab, and Azeri communities—might demand greater local autonomy or democratic representation. This, in turn, could push the central government toward debates over federalism and decentralization, while reformist movements across the country might use it as a precedent for regional democracy. Turkey is highly sensitive to Kurdish autonomy. Democratic change in Rojhelat might increase Kurdish political activism in Turkey, potentially triggering stricter security policies or renewed negotiations with Kurdish movements. In the south of Kurdistan, in Erbil, the authorities of the Kurdistan Region might gain stronger cross-border cultural and economic ties, as well as greater political influence among Kurds in Iran. Such developments could strengthen a transnational Kurdish identity. A democratic Rojhelat could reinforce the idea of pan-Kurdish cooperation without necessarily creating a single unified state. Instead, it might foster deeper cross-border cultural interaction and more coordinated political strategies among Kurdish parties.
The risks and challenges, however, would remain considerable. Democratic change could also generate tensions with the government in Iran or with neighboring countries that fear separatism. Unlike some other Kurdish regions, Rojhelat currently has very limited international backing. The Kurdistan Region gained significant international partnerships after Gulf War, while the administration in Rojava received international support during the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. By contrast, the movements in Rojhelat lack comparable global recognition or strategic alliances, leaving their aspirations largely isolated within the international system. Iran will be liberated from the tyranny of the mullahs, that liberation will begin in Kurdistan. In Iraq, when the first Gulf War started in 1991, the allied forces’ objective was to liberate Kuwait from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Their objective was achieved in roughly 100 hours, according to Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the operation. The United States forces subsequently halted operations in southern Iraq for fear that the uprising would replace Saddam’s regime with forces aligned to the Islamic Republic of Iran, rather than leading to a stable post-war political transition. Kurdistan was left to the mercy of Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, Iraqi forces eventually withdrew from the Kurdistan area, and the Kurdish front was put in charge of managing the region with support from the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1992, the Kurdistan Region government was established, becoming an aspiration for the wider Iraqi Kurdish political movement to build a political base in Erbil, including groups such as the Iraqi National Congress.
During the Second Gulf War in 2003 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, large United States forces crossed the border and began much of their operation from the Kurdistan region. Without Kurdish territory, the liberation and invasion of Iraq would have been considerably more difficult. The cooperation of Kurdish political parties with the United States and allied forces was an important condition in the effort to topple Saddam’s regime. The Kurdistan Regional Government became a political model and source of aspiration for other Kurdish regions. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) represented hope for Kurds across the broader region. The main Kurdish political parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—played pivotal roles in the events of 2003. Without their participation, the operation could not have been fully finalized
In Syria, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with the help of Turkey, managed to advance toward the Syrian capital of Damascus. The city had already been largely liberated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the United States since around 2014, while much of Syrian territory was controlled by the SDF with U.S. backing. HTS forces led by Ahmed al Sharaa could not fully control or secure the Syrian army positions without broader military coordination, including the influence of Kurdish forces led by the SDF. Kurds in Rojava have enjoyed a degree of autonomy and have maintained their own administration since the withdrawal of forces loyal to Bashar al Assad during the early years of the Syrian civil war. Kurdish-led groups took control of several towns in northern Syria after Syrian government forces withdrew. This period is generally considered the beginning of Rojava’s self-rule. In January 2014, the region formally declared three autonomous cantons—Kobani, Afrin, and Jazira—and adopted a governing charter. In March 2016, the administration announced a border federal system called the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.” Since 2018 to the present, the system has evolved into the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which governs much of the territory once called Rojava.
In Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat), Kurdish nationalism is primarily a politics of affirming Kurdish national identity. Kurdish nationalism in Rojhelat is largely seen as a product of historical repression and assimilation policies toward Kurds by the Iranian state. These dynamics are rooted in broader political and cultural processes. The denial of Kurdish ethnicity and national identity within Iran is sometimes associated with constitutional and state policy debates. Federalist movements, which currently influence many Kurdish political currents across Kurdistan, are viewed by some as a potential way to protect Kurdish identity and overcome the fragmentation of Kurdish culture. The harsh treatment of Kurdish political activism under the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran has made it difficult for some Kurds to view themselves as fully integrated within the Iranian state. In light of recent geopolitical disputes between Iran and the international community regarding its nuclear program—amid suspicions that nuclear capabilities could be used in armed conflict—tensions have increased, raising concerns about possible confrontation involving the United States and Israel, which have negotiated with Iran for an extended period over security and strategic issues.
Kurdish political parties in Rojhelat and their armed or affiliated movements remain among the most significant actors within Iranian territory at this stage. As noted by Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “the Iranian homeland, though still formally the birthplace of Armenians, Kurds, and Baluchis, as well as Persians and others, increasingly came to represent the vatan (country) of Shi‘i Persians through the persistent effort of the state to suppress competing cultural identities.” Some Kurdish nationalist discourse frames the struggle as a historical response to political marginalization. Following the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurds participated actively in demonstrations that helped destabilize the Pahlavi regime. The political vacuum created by the overthrow of the Shah was quickly filled by the forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, which remain major political actors in Rojhelat.
References:
Falah, A., & Dawod, H. (2006). The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics. London: Saqi.
Romano, D., & Gurses, M. (2014). Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chaliand, G. (1993). A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Olivier Branch Press.
