
By Mufid Abdulla:
This is a response to the statement issued by the office of the President of Kurdistan about ‘the first phase of reform’ since March 2011. Few of Barzani’s reforms will achieve what they promise and some will simply be disregarded. We all know that the protestors in Kurdistan generated public debate to force the government to listen to the people. Ever since the uprising began on 17th February 2011, the Kurdish leadership has claimed that it plans to reform the system.
The three main points of the official statement cover: (1) a review of land allocation for investment projects with investigations into 300 projects; (2) the rule of law, including the establishment of a judicial institute to enhance the training and recruitment of new judges; and (3) administrative matters. In the past few weeks, we are told, a number of corrupt senior KRG officials have been dismissed. This is the nub of Barzani’s reform programme. But it is not real reform, of the kind we desperately need in south Kurdistan. It is the job of the police and legal system to investigate, arrest, prosecute and convict people who are guilty of corrupt acts. Merely dismissing corrupt officials is not reform. The investigation of 300 land contracts is not reform. Setting up an institute of law is not reform. What Barzani is doing is to try and kill the peoples’ appetite and taste for change.
We need to consider what real reform means and whose responsibility it is to carry it out. What should be the priority of the government and officials in implementing these reforms? Which countries have been through this type of reform and how? My review will be brief, seeking to define the means of transformation for several countries that have been through a process of systemic reform in recent decades.
Over the last thirty years, most countries which have attempted such reform have received help from international institutions. Since 1980 some of these reforms have been overseen by the World Bank under the ‘structural adjustment programme’. History has shown the need for strong institutions and leadership to carry through these reforms.
China, Kasakhstan, Africa and Kuwait – a comparison
In 1980 several African countries adopted the ‘Lagos plan’ for economic development based on a ‘twin plan structure’. In 1985 economic reforms were aimed at reducing external debts and preparing a common platform for action – this plan was supported and adapted by the UN in thirteen sessions. From 1986 to 1990, reforms included the structural transformation: in this way productivity increased and the general economy benefited. After 1990 the UN set up a new commission for integration, diversification and transformation of these African economies. In this way, much of Africa has been through four historic stages of change and transformation.
The stunning transformation of China makes it crucial for the world economy to understand how this country has been through so many stages of reform. The process started with the ‘open door policy’ in the late 1970s, leading on, essentially, to 30 years that have changed the world. The most crucial point for scholars and specialists to focus on is the transformation of the Chinese public sector. In China the state carried out this role. The state looked at reform of the public sector in relation to macroeconomic policies (government organisation) and microeconomic policies (accounting and budgeting). The administrative reforms have been a crucial part of the more general process of transforming the Chinese economy and awakening of the “big tiger” (Wilson 1996): a process that comprises 30 years of reform of national and local government by downsizing and modernising (Wong and Bird 2007).
It is impossible to find another example in history of a country that has experienced so complex a process of administrative changes as China has experienced in the last 60 years (Chan 1999). There are some important trends identified in this reform. First, in 1980 local government assumed direct responsibility for the administration of public services (Lin et all 2005) Second, the party authorities were forced to select professionals and specialists based on their technical qualifications and job performance (Burns 1989). Third, the strategy was to downsize central and local bureaucracy.
In the case of Kazakhstan (located in central Asia, it became independent from the old Soviet Union in 1991), there was a transition from communist party administration to a public administration reform model. Kazakhstan has tried to reform the administration inherited from the Soviet Union. There were three key factors in this administrative reform: decentralisation, e-government and civil service reform.
During the past two decades a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe. This revolution aims to move decision-making for local public services closer to the people (Shah and Thompson 2004). The decentralisation of development policies and programmes to local institutions has been emphasized in developing countries due to increasing recognition that: expansive administrative responsibilities cannot be carried out by central government alone; socio-economic progress requires active people’s participation; resource mobilisation necessitates local initiatives; and that devolution of power is a pre-condition for a democratic mode of governance. (Haque 1997)
In the effective application of systemic reforms, governments must explore and engage with opportunities both within and outside the public sector. Making public services more efficient and responsive through the involvement of civil society and business organisation is one of the major challenges faced by governments. Public sectors in many countries have embarked on profound change in their processes to confront the problems. It also involves relationships and cooperation among the public sector, private agencies and civil societies regarding the organization of policy processes and the delivery of services (Siddiquee and Mohammed 2007).
One of the central elements in the changing role of the public sector and the construction of a new public administration is the concept of de-centralisation (Hope 2002). Decentralisation can be defined as a transfer of authority or responsibility for decision-making, planning, management or resource allocation from central government to local government. It is also an attempt to respond to local needs as well as the needs of the dis-empowered in particular (Friedmann,1992).
According to Borins (1994) Hope (2002) and Silverman (1992), within the context of the New Public Administration, de-centralisation is seen as the means for:
1. Government to provide high-quality services that citizens value.
2. Increasing managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing central administration.
3. Demanding, measuring or rewarding both organisation and individual performances.
4. Enabling managers to acquire human and technological resources to meet performance targets.
5. Empowering citizens through their enhanced participation in decision-making.
6. Improving economic and managerial efficiency .
Privatisation
Privatisation, or the transfer of state assets to the private sector, is a central component of downsizing. Kuwait is a country which recently went through a transformation, away from the state managing their economy and people. What influenced Kuwait more than anything in the democratisation process were the factors of gender and the media. Recent reforms in these areas influenced the democratisation process, popular participation and the media landscape.(Ferecs,2010)
Finally, Barzani should ask himself how the AKP in Turkey increased its share of the vote from 34.3% in 2002 to 49.9% in 2011. The AKP embarked on major reforms and transformation in Turkey.
Barzani commands the Kurdistan political scene which is due to one factor and the strategic alliance with the PUK. Think of a Shakespearian court, with two sides co-existing nervously while knowing that at some point they will again come to blows. Barzani forces Kurdistan to allow the freedom of corrupt politicians and the destruction of democracy.
In a programme of real reform, no issues should be beyond discussion. Kurdistan should have weekly debates initiated by economists, lawyers and philosophers. This historic opportunity for real reform is totally lost on an ageing KRG which thought it was dealing with ‘a bunch of kids’. But these leaders are wrong – because their ideas are old, their opinions are old, their minds are old and their spirit is old. People need to beware of the well–heeled traitors although they have begun to confront their mortality. We need them to understand the social reality. From the history of China we can conclude that it will never be too late to make real change, but the most important thing is how you start.
Conclusion
From the above examples and literature reviews, we cannot find any comparison with Barzani’s paltry initiatives. The main priority for reform in the KRG should be the public sector. Public administration is a central feature of our budget and expenditure. In proportion to our population, we have more civil servants than any other country in the region. In Kurdistan public sector reform has been hindered by having two separate administrations in Sulaymani and Hawler. Additionally, unfortunately the bulk of these administrative systems are inherited from Saddam’s era: they are not oriented towards serving the people and providing local services.
An effective health service, good standard of schools and the provision of good housing – these are the main services the public sector should efficiently provide.
The current Kurdish cabinet, led by Barham Saleh, cannot carry out these reforms because: (1) they do not have a strong enough institutional base; and (2) there is disunity of the PUK and KDP in administration and decision-making. Recently some of the decision-making has been taken over by the President of Kurdistan. But reforms should start from the bottom. The ‘reform’ intervention by the President of Kurdistan is nothing more than confusing and misleading for the ordinary people. Real reform should be based on thorough research, designed to find out what people want. I trust the government has received the list of demands raised by the people and the proposals made by the opposition.
References
Burns, J.P (1989) Chiness civil service reform in the 13th Party congress proposals” The China Quarterly, No 120 pp 739-70
Borins, S. 1994 “Government I Transition : a new paradigm in public administration “ report on the In augural conference and commonwealth association of public administration of management (28 August, Charlottetown.( Prince Edwards Island)
Child, J.and Tse, D.K (2001)”China’s transition and its implications for international business”, Journal of international studies ,vol 32 NO.1 PP5-21
Chana, H.S. (1999) “Downsizing the central government in the central ,the people’s republic of China” Management ,Vol.2 No.3 pp 305-30
Friedmann, J. (1992) “Empowerment :The alternative development” ,Blackwell, Cambridge ,USA
Ferecs, Tursoczy (2010) “Kuwait democratization in process five factors of democratization of their state in Kuwait”. Lund University ,Department of Arab and Middle eastern studies .Bachelor Thesis
Hope, K.R (2002) “The new public management, a perspective from Africa” in McLaughlin et all in “New public management: current trends and future prospects”, Rutledge, London and NEW York.
Hope, K.R (2001) “The new public management; context and practice in Africa”, International Public Management Journal Vol.4 No.2
Haque, M.S. (1997) “Local governance in developing nations ,and re-examining the question of accountability”, Regional development Dialoque ,Vol18 No.2 pp iiixxiii
Lin, J.Y, Rna, T. and Mingsing, L. (2005) “Decentralisation and local governance in the context of China’s transition”, Perspective, Vol 6 No 2 pp 25-36
Silvermann, J.M. (1992) “Public sector decentralisation, economic policy and sector investment programmes”, Technical paper NO 188.World Bank, Washington D .C
Shah, A. and Thompson, T. (2004) “Implementing decentralized local governance : a treacherous road with potholes, detours and road closures” World Bank Policy research working paper No 3353mThe World Bank, Washington ,DC
Siddiquee, N.A and Mohammed M.Z. (2007) “Paradox of public sector reforms in Malaysia – a good governance perspective”, Public Administrative Quarterly,Vol.31,pp 284-313
Wilson, D. (1996) “China – the Big Tiger, a Nation Awakes”, Abacus, London
Wong, C.P.W. and Bird, R.M.(2007) “China’s Fiscal System: a Work in Progress I”, Brandt ,L. and Rowski, T. (Eds) “China’s Great Transformation: Origins, Mechanism, and Consequences of the Post-Reform Economic Boom”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge



Berez kak Mufid,
first of all I welcome yourt the idea of comparing Kurdistan with other countries and try to find out what are the lessons to be learned.
Unfortunately you, like the vast majority of the current opposition intellectuals, in your very first attempt of analysing the situation in Kurdistan you overlook an essential difference when compared to othher countries.
Many intellectuals compare Kurdistan to the western countries in which they enjoyed asylum and compare the kurdish parties, institutions, politicians etc. one to one with what they have seen in the west based on a superficial understanding of the western societies without understanding the deep and real structures beind all of it.
It is to be welcome that you are trying to compare Kurdistan with countries which are not so many thousend miles ahead of us such as those western countries.
But you, as most of the other critics, overlook that there is the big difference which is all those countries are sovereign states who are members of the UN and their external integrity is safeguarded either because they are strong enough on their own or are members of alliances which protect them.
South-Kurdistan is just a region with a regional administration having no powers over som 50% of its territory. It is a region 100% dependent on the budget that is generously sent to Hewler after many rounds of fighting and pushing around in Bagdad every year.
Those countries you are comparing Kurdistan with have been running themselves for ages and have uncomparably more experience in administering themselves by themselves.
It is for them very natural to be independent rather than being commanded by another nation.
Even more important than that is the fact that those countries have been united in being one nation with common higher national interests which all agree on.
This is not the case in Kurdistan. We have may different regions which are less than united.
Apart of the Yezidis, Shebek etc. who are not even sure whether they should regard themselves Kurds or not we have groups like the Faylis where their kurdishness is not disputed but in big parts feel more related to arab shiites becase they are shiites and their religous identity seems to be more important to them.
Then we have Slemani who regard themselves as superior to other kurdish regions bcause they think that they are the better kurds, the real cultivated ones, far more intellectual and more patriotic.
Then you have all those many tribes with their complicaed structures and relations with other tribes and the complicated cross relationships to the many political parties and religous entities.
You have the historical divide between the “imareti Baban and Soran” which is still there and marks pretty much the borders of the division we have between PUK/Gorran basis and PDK regions of influence.
SO all in all we have a very shaky fragile balance of power which is hanging at a thin fibre always ready to be cut.
With all those contradictions and complexities in the southern kurdish society (I didn’t mention the other parts of Kurdistan because that would make the overall picture even more complicated)..
with all that in our society we have little chances for a realy coordinated advance and real reform because whereever you touch something there is a real danger that the whole structure collapses.
In my view the real achievement of Barzani since 1991 has been his ability to prevent this fragile bvalance to collapse which unfortunately did during the civil war days in the 1990s.
So what we have in Kurdistan is not China, nor Kuwait or Kazakhstan.
What we have is a tiny regional administartion completely at the mercy of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, USA etc.
(just yesterday the kurdish Peshmarga minister had to admit that they are powerless against the iranian and turkish bombardments in Kurdistan).
With such a weak and powerless kurdish administration and with all those previously described cultural and political historical problems in Kurdistan we are hardly comparable with those countries.
BEfore we can start to learn from the details of how to organize economical, administrational reforms, as mentiond in the resources provided by you, we have to do our homework and enable our society of being able to start at all.
It is interesting that you mentioend China to learn from.
Just ask yourself what was the main “feature” of China from the beginning?
It was:
1- the will of the chinese people to free China from foreigners (Japanese, Britian, US etc.) which they did in their liberation war after 1945
and their total refusal to collaborate with their enemies against chinese national interests.
Compare that with Kurdistan where you have many groups who are happy to get paid millions by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the West, etc. and care little whether that is in the national interest of Kurdistan or not.
2- China has been a brutal dictatorship which killed “millions” of innocent chinese.
They still have a communist one party rule.
This is really something that the kurdish intellectuals should learn from.
You have to first build the unity among the people, the infrastructure and economical power. But this can hardly be achieved if you have a lose democratic structure as in the West.
All those success countries such as China, South Korea, Brasil, Turkey etc.
have started as dictatorships or at least very autocratic regimes and ruled their countries with an iron fist with little room for individual political freedoms.
This has been going on for decades untill their social and economical structure was strong and advanced enough.
Then and only then they started to relax their grip of power and allowed more economical and political freedoms.
Some Kurds think that they can achieve a complete metamorphosis in a much shorter time than it is possible the natural way.
We are yet nothing but they all demand complete democratic rights like in the liberal societies in the west.
This is simply not possible because we don’t have the prerequisites of those societies. They must be built yet.
And we if do try to do it that way we are predestined to fail because of the many complexities and contradictions in our society and because there are too many enemies who would be happy to see Kurdistan failing.
Besides we are far behind those compared countriees in regards to man power and the technological basis to manage an advanced society in such a short time.
How many bridges, buildings, technologically demanding projects are done by Kurds?
Although we have 100 thousends of university graduates but we have little real know how and technicall capabilities.
Themoney is kurdish the rest is done by non Kurds.
Your appeal for debate and wide discussions among intellectuals and specialists is very welcome but the first prerequisite is the ability of Kurds to seperate emotions from facts.
We all want the real advance to come as soon as possible but it would be wrong to ignore the reality that makes an immediate change in the wished manner impossible.
Many kurdish opponents remind me of the english band Queen who sang:
” I want it all.. I want it now”
in the case of South Kurdistan that would be rather childish considering the kurdish facts on the ground.
Slaw u rez
@Dilshad Xoshnaw, can you tell us when was the USA government established? When did they right their constitution? Perhaps you should start reding Wikipedia becaue you appear to be a Wikipedia man! 🙂 (you need to read and study history and formation of governments and economic systems, basic values of human rights and whether or not in 21st century they needed time to implement, basic knowledge of formation and execuses of dictatorial systems, etc.).
Simply put, an outstanding article! Unfortunately, the present power in Kurdistan doesn’t understand science; only a widespread uprising, which is bound to happen.
Dilshad’s comment recent trends of globalisation in the world. Reference to China, he is not aware of recent developments in China. China has the largest investment in the world – aims to make more – as it elsewhere as in South Eastern and Southern Europe.
With the largest foreign reserves currently around 3 Trillion Euro’s China could buy half of Greece’s privatizable public assets at the drop of a hat. China in 2011 is a long way from such a human authority starting with the great reformer Deng Xiaoping, it stake a moral claim to have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. In the eyes of developing countries around the world, it is model of state managed capitalism it is an ideological challenge to market capitalsm.
Kak Dilshad surey the above achievement for China is not comming with no disrespect to the human capital and human right value.
That’s the reason we have to learn a lot from them – can i say Iraq’s crisis should be Kurdistan’s opportunity
Rez Haval