Iraq in chaos: Time to face reality

Shakhawan Shorash

By Shakhawan Shorash:

As I have pointed out in several articles, the rebuilding process of the Iraqi state has failed because it did not address critical questions and key problems, and because the reconstruction program was imposed on the Iraqis without including the right to choose alternatives. The element of imposition, and the arrogance of the powerful Iraqi and US leaders, resulted in deepening the internal crises and pushing the ethnic groups to disintegration rather than creating a peaceful foundation for coexistence between them.

Due to the continuing clash of ethnic interests, the gap between the three main ethnic groups is becoming wider and wider, with each ethnic group directly pursuing their own interests while ignoring the common interest of the state. Loyalty toward the central authority is declining while loyalty to local authorities is increasing.

Amidst the new development of internal crises and due to the legitimation gap in the Sunni area, the extreme Islamist group known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has taken power in several key cities and is creating chaos in the region. ISIS has imposed sharia law and has already killed several hundred people, among them many civilians. ISIS’s existence is perhaps temporary, but its presence in the Sunni area and parts of the Syrian territory is a serious threat to security in the region.

This extreme development is a result of key unsolved problems, as well as the imposition of political circumstances upon the Sunni minority. The escalation not only indicates disloyalty of the people toward the central authority and the Iraqi Army in the Sunni area, it also exposes the significant legitimation vacuum that the new political system created in the area. Beyond the external involvement and conflicting interests of the Shia and Sunni regional powers, Iraq’s Sunni residents are dissatisfied because they see themselves as victims of the new political situation after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Additionally, the internal disagreement between the Sunnis and the numerous politically extreme organizations in the area is another factor that makes the area vulnerable and renders it a useful ground for the Islamist extremists.

The rebuilding policy did not focus on key conflict factors or on the long-term historical conflict between the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds in the country. In the past, Iraq existed only by force, and the result of this imposed community has been years of internal conflict and war that culminated in crimes against humanity and genocide. Iraq cannot continue to exist as a united country if the aspirations of the main ethnic groups are marginalized. When ethnic groups cannot live together in a common community, democratic and free decision-making power over their own political destiny is the only practical and rational option.

One of the main arguments against the creation of new states has been that the existence of a new state could lead to new conflicts and instability in the region. Another argument is that it would create a huge economic burden. However, preserving the current Iraqi state has proved the opposite and it has resulted in serious consequences: More than 100,000 people have been killed and the economic burden has been enormous. In contrast, the stable and semi-independent Kurdish region has experienced continued improvement and prosperity.

Iraq’s bloody past and the long-term conflict between its three main ethnic groups illustrates the failure of the optimistic plans and ideas of, for instance, the constructivists, with regard to the creation of a new coherent and rational narrative in the common community and solutions for the internal ethnic conflict in this multiethnic state. The Iraqi example exposes the necessity of not ignoring key factors of past conflicts and the need for openness to constructive alternatives.

Today, Iraq is divided into three regions: the Kurdish north, the Sunni triangle, and the Shia south. The country is faced with two main options. One is to continue the new political system put into place after Saddam’s fall, and to regain control of the situation before the fall of Mosul; the other is to create a new constitutional agreement that gives the three main ethnic groups sufficient power and opens the way for the exercise of self-determination. The first option carries a risk of more instability and could lead the country into political chaos again if the main ethnic groups, especially the Kurds and the Sunnis, are not satisfied with the current political and economic conditions. This pushes the Kurds, especially, toward secession, which could result in a Kurd-Arab war, regional military intervention, and chaos. In fact Nuri al-Malki´s recent hostile policy against the Kurds gives the Kurds no other alternatives than secession. The second option would give the ethnic groups freedom and sufficient power to govern their own territories as they wish, and they would only seek secession if the country did not sufficiently assure their security and wealth. Self-determination should be seen as a natural right of these ethnic groups, and the common state has to prove that it is in the groups’ interests to remain part of the united country. Thus, the imposed element of the common state is resolved by free coexistence with the community.

The Kurds have been de facto independent and have ruled their area since 1991. The new political and constitutional agreement after the fall of Saddam Hussein has suffered from disagreements and dissatisfaction and, at a few specific times, violent clashes seemed close. The new Iraqi constitution has suffered from discrepancies and complications, and has failed to address key problems. The Kurds will probably not return to Baghdad to accept a temporary solution based on the previous constitutional agreement, in light of the new situation. If Iraq can ever overcome the new political crises, a new constitutional agreement that addresses the demands of the main ethnic groups, especially the Kurds, will be necessary. The new agreement and the political leadership must have the capacity to resolve key issues of conflict, such as internal security dilemmas, wealth and power distribution, territorial border disputes, discrimination and marginalization problems, and the right to self-determination, in order to prevent violent conflict and more bloodshed whether Iraq remains united or becomes divided.

Finally, ethnic conflict in multiethnic states must be focused on separately and within its own framework in the state in question, and the solution must focus on the internal conflict in each specific state. It will harm the process to involve external interests and to associate the problem with ethnic conflicts in neighboring states. The Kurdish case is complicated due to Kurdish problems in other states in the region, but the Kurdish question must be solved in the distinct state in question by democratic and constitutional agreements inside that state, regardless of external actors’ interests. Therefore, Iraq must solve its own internal conflicts and focus on the interests of its main ethnic communities regardless of the national interests of Iran, Turkey, or other states. The international community has a duty to protect the outcome of this political process and to prevent external interference.

Shakhawan Shorash was born in Hawler in Southern Kurdistan. He is a freelance writer with a BA in political science from Southern University of Denmark (Odense) and a Masters degree in political science from the University of Copenhagen.

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